The regime’s revenge The outcome of Belarus’s upcoming presidential vote may be a foregone conclusion, but after the 2020 protests, Lukashenko is leaving nothing to chance
On January 26, Belarus will hold its presidential vote — the first since August 2020, when the country experienced its largest protests and harshest crackdown on dissent in modern history. Over the past four and a half years, tens of thousands of Belarusians have been arrested, interrogated, beaten, fined, convicted, or pushed out of their jobs, while hundreds of thousands more have fled the country. Aleksandr Lukashenko, still seemingly haunted by the events of 2020, is taking every possible measure to prevent a repeat that could threaten his hold on power. Meduza reports on the state of Belarus ahead of the “election.”
How will the ‘elections’ be conducted?
Election Day is set for January 26. BELPOL, an association of former Belarusian security officials, alleges that nearly all — 97 percent — of the heads of electoral commissions have previously been involved in vote rigging. For the first time, BELPOL notes, the elections will proceed without independent observers or candidates from the democratic opposition. Additionally, there will be no polling stations abroad; Belarusians living overseas have been told to return to the country to cast their votes.
Photographing or filming ballots has been banned — an apparent response to the 2020 elections, when numerous ballot photos served as evidence of widespread fraud.
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Who’s running?
Aleksandr Lukashenko, in power since 1994, is seeking his seventh consecutive term. In October, he announced he would run “if supporters said it was necessary — and, of course, they will.” Just four days later, a “spontaneous” social media trend called “Nado” (“Necessary”) appeared in Belarus, with participants ostensibly urging Lukashenko to run again (though there was no need; by that point, he’d already submitted his documents to the Central Election Commission). Lukashenko claimed the campaign “wasn’t organized,” but “Nado” ultimately became the slogan of his re-election campaign.
Lukashenko will face four challengers, whom independent media have referred to as “background dancers” — their very inclusion on the ballot is seen as proof that the authorities don’t consider them a threat. The most “oppositional” candidate is Hanna Kanapatskaya, a former parliamentarian. In 2019, she proposed a law guaranteeing Lukashenko’s immunity from prosecution after leaving office, and in 2020, she participated in the presidential election, officially finishing third with 1.68 percent of the vote. Kanapatskaya has promised to free political prisoners, though she avoids calling them that and refrains from criticizing Lukashenko.
The three other candidates are:
- Sergei Syrankov, first secretary of the Communist Party. Syrankov has stated he is running “not instead of, but alongside the president” and has proposed prosecuting members of the LGBTQ+ community and restoring monuments to Stalin.
- Oleg Gaidukevich, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party. Gaidukevich is something of a “heir apparent” rival — his father participated in three previous election campaigns. Gaidukevich argues that only “patriots” should run, so that “enemies will look at the presidential candidates and realize there’s nothing for them to gain in this country.”
- Aleksandr Khizhnyak, the head of the Republican Party of Labor and Justice. The least visible of the candidates, Khizhnyak rarely makes public appearances, and his party’s Telegram channel has fewer than 200 subscribers (with no presence on other platforms).
Two additional potential candidates withdrew from the race, citing the need to “save the country” and declaring their loyalty to Lukashenko, stating, “We are the president’s team.”
What about the Belarusian opposition?
The opposition has dismissed the elections as a “non-election” and urged people to cast a vote against all candidates.
“In a society where repression has continued unabated for four years, any form of protest — even peaceful — is currently impossible. But Belarusians feel the need to take some kind of action on that day. It’s clear that no votes will be counted, and there will be no honest observers. But we also know that there’s a practice in Belarus of herding people to polling stations to create the illusion of mass participation. That’s why we’re asking those forced to take part in this sham election to vote against all candidates,” said exiled Belarussian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.
After the new presidential elections in Belarus were announced, Tsikhanouskaya was asked whether she would seek re-election. She responded that she wouldn’t: “Our revolution [in 2020] was about free and fair elections. And people gave me a mandate until those elections can be organized.”
For now, Tsikhanouskaya and her allies are working on a project to issue a so-called New Belarus passport. Applications for this long-promised document will open on election day, January 26. The passport is intended to ease the lives of Belarusians with expired official documents — if other countries were to recognize it. But for now, the New Belarus passport holds no official status and remains largely symbolic. The project has also faced criticism, from concerns over its cost to questions about its security.
What’s happening with political prisoners?
In 2024, for the first time since the 2020 elections, Aleksandr Lukashenko began releasing political prisoners en masse — a move analysts see as an attempt to garner Western attention. Since June, he has pardoned 250 people. However, none of the most prominent political prisoners were among those freed, and some were only weeks away from completing their sentences when released.
Lukashenko hasn’t freed any of the opposition leaders from 2020, but he has at least shown that they’re alive (which, given the current circumstances, is an achievement in itself). In November, Roman Protasevich — a former opposition figure who avoided a lengthy prison term by cooperating with authorities — published photos with Maria Kalesnikava, and in early January, he posted ones with Viktar Babaryka. Both remain in prison and hadn’t been heard from in over a year and a half. There were rumors about serious health problems, but this confirms that they are at least alive. It remains unclear when they might be released.
Are the repressions still going on?
Since the 2020 elections and protests, repressions have never ceased — and in 2024, they only intensified. According to the Belarusian human rights center Viasna, 1,721 people were convicted in Belarus in 2024 on politically motivated criminal charges, while 5,800 were convicted in politically motivated administrative cases. Over 1,200 political prisoners remain behind bars, including at least 30 families. The most prominent detainees are held under what human rights activists call an “incommunicado” regime, with no contact with the outside world.
That’s not all. In 2024, Belarusian courts issued nearly 1,500 rulings labeling various materials as “extremist” — almost 40 percent of all such decisions made since 2008. Political dissidents continue to face beatings, torture, and denial of medical care. Security forces also target those who have fled abroad, threatening them through messaging apps, seeking their extradition, intimidating their relatives in Belarus, and arresting those who return to the country.
And even that wasn’t enough — repression escalated further in the lead-up to the elections. Protests seem unimaginable in the current climate, but this past November, Lukashenko claimed he had learned from 2020, saying, “Power isn’t held with outstretched arms.” In the fall, the Belarusian outlet Nasha Niva reported that security forces had been instructed to ensure “no one so much as squeaks.” This was followed by waves of far-reaching election-related arrests and raids.
On January 15, Belarusian Prosecutor General Andrei Shved unexpectedly announced that security forces had identified all the “extremists” in the country, stating that they were either already convicted or awaiting trial. Does this signal an end to the repressions? It’s possible not even the prosecutor general himself knows the answer.
Is Lukashenko guaranteed to “win”?
There’s no reason to think otherwise. His “victory” is a foregone conclusion — the only question is what percentage of the vote he will “grant himself,” according to Belarussian journalist and political analyst Aliaksandr Klaskouski.
In November, Belarusian propagandist Ihar Tur wrote on Telegram that Lukashenko would secure over 90 percent of the vote. In all previous elections, his official results hovered near 80 percent. That was the percentage he received in the 1994 election, widely regarded as the last free presidential election in Belarus’s modern history.
However, a study by pro-government Belarusian sociologists, published just 10 days before the election, claims that 82.5 percent of Belarusians are allegedly ready to vote for Lukashenko.
What happens next?
Viachaslau Korosten, a columnist for Pozirk, predicts that after the election, Lukashenko will continue efforts to “turn the page” and restore his legitimacy in the eyes of the West — if not through formal recognition of the election results, then at least through practical steps like re-establishing diplomatic ties or resuming trade.
However, his chances of success seem slim. Lukashenko remains deeply reliant on Moscow (and sources tell Meduza that these “brotherly ties” are likely to grow even closer) and is unwilling to end his campaign of repression. “In a way, it’s rational,” Korosten writes. “Since 2020, Lukashenko has resolved none of the conflicts between himself and the protesters. He has made no concessions, no gestures of goodwill. On the contrary — he responded with violence, deepening the antagonism.”
Political analyst Artyom Shraibman argues that Lukashenko has yet to mentally recover “from the trauma of 2020” and that, as long as he remains in power, the climate in Belarus will not grow any freer.
